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Does China Engage in Debt-Trap Diplomacy? 
 
 
According to the Washington-based Institute of International Finance (IIF)1, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) is the world’s largest official creditor nation with its outstanding debt 
claims on the rest of the world totalling an estimated US$5.5 trillion in 2019 or more than 6 
percent of global GDP (IIF 2019). However, given Beijing’s very limited transparency in its 
disclosures when it comes to its external lending, and now its culpability in the spread of the 
deadly coronavirus, the accusation that the PRC has for years engaged in “debt-trap 
diplomacy” 2  has come under renewed scrutiny (e.g., Brautigam 2020; Chellaney 2017). 
Specifically, the charge is that the Chinese government, which is the world’s leading creditor 
lending via its multi-billion dollar “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) as well as various state-
owned and controlled entities, lures developing countries, its particular, the low-income 
countries with easy money to fund often economically unviable projects. Its ultimate goal is to 
get access to the borrowers’ local markets and natural resources and indirectly to control or 
outright seize assets and resources, including extracting economic and political concessions 
when these countries fail to service their loans, which is often given at market or above market 
interest rates and carry shorter maturities, thereby requiring regular refinancing3 (Wang 2019). 
Some critics even claim that Beijing, like the Trojan horse brings gifts which does irreparable 
harm to vulnerable and unsuspecting recipients who are forced to cede part of their sovereignty 
to an unscrupulously predatory authoritarian power (TRT World 2019). 
However, Beijing’s widening global reach may be nothing more than a rising power 
trying to expand and consolidate its economic, diplomatic, and geostrategic interests 
                                                 
1 IIF is an association of the financial industry with over 450 members from more than 70 countries. 
2 To the best of my knowledge, the term “debt-trap diplomacy” was first coined by Brahma Chellaney, one of 
India’s leading foreign affairs expert (see Chellaney 2017). 
3 In May 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo criticized China for peddling “corrupt infrastructure deals in 
exchange for political influence,” and using “bribe-fuelled debt-trap diplomacy” to undermine good governance 
(see Wang 2019). 
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commensurate with its growing capabilities. Given Beijing’s huge, indeed excess, financial 
reserves, China’s emergence as the world’s banker should hardly come as a surprise. Arguably, 
the motivation behind Beijing’s extensive lending and its unapologetically ambitious BRI is to 
allow China to more efficiently utilize its excess financial reserves by investing abroad, 
including consolidating the comparative advantage it enjoys in large-scale engineering and 
construction. Moreover, China’s outbound investments not only enable Beijing to secure 
markets that can provide it with essential goods and resources but also fill deficiencies in 
developing country infrastructure, energy, agricultural sectors, which are welcomed as they 
provide much needed employment and help boost economic growth (Hurley et al. 2019). 
However, since lending and borrowing are inherently risky and occasionally go sour, it does 
not necessarily mean that some capricious debt-trap diplomacy is at work. It is also important 
to note that the PRC has invested billions of dollars in developing countries despite cognizant 
of the fact that many of these countries have a history of debt sustainability problems, including 
habitually defaulting, which is contrary to the conventional belief of both authoritarian and 
democratic governments. Finally, the common refrain that developing countries are reluctant 
to borrow from the World Bank and Western governments because, unlike Beijing, they require 
transparency, oversight, environmental sustainability, respect for human rights, among other 
conditions, is only partially true. It is equally true that World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) lending is unduly intrusive, with cumbersome and time consuming red-tape, with 
the funds often not forthcoming either due to insufficient resources or hesitation to invest in 
costly infrastructure, but, which developing countries sorely need (Humphrey 2015).  
However, the debt-trap narrative is often privileged because of the excessively secretive 
nature of Chinese diplomacy. For example, despite being a major global creditor, the Chinese 
government does not provide official data on its international lending, nor does it disclose 
details regarding the volume nor the terms of the loans it provides, much of which is between 
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governments, and how the debt negotiations are adjudicated if the borrower cannot service its 
debts. For their part, borrower countries have also not been forthcoming on the details of their 
financial transactions with the PRC. In fact, China lends more to developing countries than all 
other bilateral creditors put together, including the World Bank, because developing country 
borrowers are willing customers. However, this does not necessarily mean that Beijing is a 
more generous lender. Morris et al. (2020), based on the analysis of a new dataset of 157 
countries to compare Chinese lending terms (interest rates, grace periods, and maturities) to 
International Development Association (IDA) and International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) lending terms over the 2000-2014 time period, as well as Chinese 
lending terms and concessionality 4  relative to World Bank, finds that “China’s official 
financing is less concessional than World Bank financing in comparable settings; however, 
nearly all Chinese loans have some degree of concessionality, which may help to explain the 
attractiveness of Chinese financing compared to market sources of finance” (Morris et al. 2020, 
Abstract).  
Similarly, because Chinese lending practices are opaque with only limited transparency 
in disclosure, even the world’s premier credit rating agencies such as Moody’s or Standard & 
Poor’s can only provide rough estimates on the size and volume of the loans Beijing disburses 
to recipients. In fact, global multilateral financial organizations such as the World Bank and 
IMF, of which China is a member, do not provide much data on Chinese external lending in 
their country data for sovereign debt. Concerns and suspicions regarding Beijing’s intentions 
have been further compounded by President Xi Jinping’s signature program, the ambitious Belt 
and Road Initiative, which, since its inception in 2013, has generously disbursed billions of 
dollars of state-backed loans to finance an extensive web of infrastructure linkages via rail, 
                                                 
4 Morris et al. (2020) “use two measures of concessionality: loan concessionality, measured as the grant element 
of an individual loan; and portfolio concessionality, which captures the overall generosity of a portfolio of funding 
to a country or group of countries by including grant funding alongside grant elements of concessional and non-
concessional loans” (Abstract). 
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road, sea, and air connecting China to the Asia, Africa, and Europe. According to the IIF, the 
BRI has funded some $730 billion in infrastructure investments in over 112 countries (IIF 
2019). Indeed, an innovative study (Horn et al. 2020) that painstakingly built a database of 
China’s capital exports by examining 5,000 loans and grants that the PRC has given to 152 
countries between 1949 and 2017 concludes “that China has extended many more loans to 
developing countries than previously known. This systematic underreporting of Chinese loans 
[about 50 percent of China’s lending to developing countries is not reported to the IMF or 
World Bank] has created a ‘hidden debt’ problem – meaning that debtor countries and 
international institutions alike have an incomplete picture on how much countries around the 
world owe to China and under which conditions. In total, the Chinese state and its subsidiaries 
have lent about US$1.5 trillion in direct loans and trade credits to more than 150 countries 
around the globe. This has turned China into the world’s largest official creditor — surpassing 
traditional, official lenders such as the World Bank, the IMF, or all OECD creditor 
governments combined.” Similarly, it is estimated that about “[US]$200 billion of emerging-
markets debt owed to China has gone unreported in official statistics in recent years” (Spegele 
and Isaac 2020). 
However, Brautigam et al. (2020), drawing on data from the China Africa Research 
Initiative of John Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the World 
Bank, and data on African borrowing and debt levels from the World Bank and the IMF’s 
International Debt Statistics, find “that Chinese loans play a more modest role in Africa’s 
struggle with debt sustainability than conventional wisdom would suggest” (p. 1). Although 
they admit that “the picture varies sharply across the continent’s 54 countries,” and overall, 
they find “that China makes up 22% of public debt stock (2018) and 29% of debt service (2020) 
in low-income Africa” (p. 1). “Chinese lenders are now a significant part of the debt picture in 
Africa, but their role should not be overestimated. In over half of the low-income countries 
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most at risk of, or already in, debt distress, Chinese lending is relatively small, with less than 
15 percent of debt stock. That is to say, their debt problems are largely caused by lenders other 
than China” (Brautigam et al. 2020, p. 12). 
Clearly, based on the existing macro-level evidence, it is difficult to emphatically prove 
that the PRC engages in debt-trap diplomacy. Rather, country experience shows much nuance 
and heterogeneity, including the case of Sri Lanka, which has become the poster-child to 
illustrate Beijing’s duplicity and complicity. Specifically, when the island nation of Sri Lanka 
ceded control of the strategic port of Hambantota, critics blamed “debt-trap diplomacy” at 
work. However, the picture is far more complex with the evidence suggesting that imprudent 
lending and borrowing sowed the seeds for debt problems, albeit, prima facie, the case may 
look like a deliberate debt-trap. After the civil war, as Sri Lanka began to rebuild its damaged 
economy, in particularly, its much neglected and crumbling infrastructure, it turned to China 
for economic assistance. Beijing flushed with cheap credit was happy to bankroll the project 
on short notice. Although Beijing’s lending rate was not any better (and in hindsight, slightly 
higher) than those offered by the World Bank and other Western governments, it did not 
demand strict conditionality, including the standard ones such as transparency, environmental 
sustainability, and respect for human rights. Of course, the Sri Lankan government, given its 
good credit ratings, would not have had difficulty obtaining credit from the private financial 
market, but it chose to go with Beijing. 
Financed with loans from the Export-Import Bank of China (mostly at commercial rates 
with a grace period of five years and a payback period of 15 years), the massive Hambantota 
port complex was constructed in phases from 2007 to 2016. Although, concerns were raised 
about the cost and financial viability of the massive “vanity project,” the Sri Lankan 
government took the gamble as it believed that Hambantota strategically located in the Indian 
Ocean would become the premier shipping and trade hub linking Europe, Africa, and the 
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Middle East to rest of Asia. However, from its inception, the port failed to generate the expected 
revenue. It not only failed to break even, but also simply did not earn enough revenue to meet 
its debt obligations. In mid-2017, in lieu of default, the Sri Lankan government proposed a 
“debt-for-equity swap” agreeing to relinquish majority control over the port by leasing it to the 
China Merchant Port Holdings Limited for an 85 percent stake and a 99-year lease (including 
control over 15,000 acres of land around the Hambantota port) in exchange for US$1.12 billion. 
US Vice-President Pence (2018) seized on this stating that “China uses so-called debt 
diplomacy to expand its influence. The terms of [its] loans are opaque at best, and the benefits 
invariably flow overwhelmingly to Beijing… Just ask Sri Lanka, which took on a massive debt 
to let Chinese state companies build a port of questionable commercial value. It may soon 
become a forward military base for China’s growing blue-water navy” (also see Fernholz 2018; 
Macan-Markar 2018).  
Is Hambantota a cautionary tale of debt-trap where Beijing, by tying the borrowers’ 
asset as a collateral, was able to surreptitiously “capture” an important asset with long-term 
geostrategic value, even if the collateral lacked commercial viability? Or is the Sri Lankan 
government’s inability to meet its debt obligations due to costly and imprudent investment in 
a project with questionable commercial viability, its already high debt servicing costs (Sri 
Lanka’s debt at 78 percent of its GDP is among the highest in South and Southeast Asia), and 
deeper structural problems in the economy – in particular, the economy’s inability to generate 
enough foreign reserves, to service its debt (Abi-Habib 2018; Lo 2019)? Indeed, the Sri Lankan 
government was optimistic that it could service the debt with revenues from fees charged by 
the port and foreign exchange earned with exports. In the end, neither option proved viable 
putting the country in a financial and balance-of-payments crisis. Last but not least, given the 
lack of transparency, an opaque tendering process, including no independent review of the 
project, domestic corruption and malfeasance cannot be ruled out. Indeed, as the Hambantota 
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port was built in the home district of then-President Rajapaksa, it is alleged that he was paid 
millions in kickbacks to finance his re-election campaign. Other senior politicians from 
Rajapaksa’s party have also being accused of corruption and collusion with the Chinese 
investors. In the end, what usually happens is that ordinary Sri Lankan citizens will end up 
paying for their government’s imprudent risk taking. 
Yet, as the old adage attributed to John Maynard Keynes reminds us, “If you owe your 
bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem. But if you owe a million, it has.” This saying 
underscores the paradoxical nature of creditor-debtor relations, namely, that the asymmetry of 
creditor-debtor power relations does not always favour the creditor. For example, China is the 
US’ major creditor with its debt to China totalling US$1.08 trillion in May 2020. It is China’s 
insatiable demand for the US. Treasuries helps keep interest rates in the US low, and if Beijing 
ever called in its debt, interest rates and prices in the US would rise with negative impact for 
economic growth. For many, this economic leverage that China has over the US is a big 
concern. However, such concerns are exaggerated as all debt is not the same. This is because 
China has to maintain significant reserves of the US debt to manage the exchange rate of the 
renminbi. In other words, Beijing buys such huge amounts of US Treasuries because it pegs its 
own currency to the dollar. This helps keep down the cost of Chinese exports. Thus, if Beijing 
decided to sharply reduce its reserve holdings, its currency’s exchange rate would rise, thereby 
increasing the price of Chinese exports. Moreover, unlike any other country, the US enjoys the 
“exorbitant privilege” of being able to borrow abroad using debt instruments denominated in 
its own currency. That is, the US dollar’s unique reserve currency role exempts the American 
sovereign. This privilege also allows the US to maintain large budget and balance of payments 
deficits because of the seemingly insatiable global appetite for liquid US treasury securities, 
which serves as a store for reserves and safe haven and allows Washington to borrow at 
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extraordinarily low interest rates despite the fact that the US deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP 
ratios are high. 
In the aftermath of the coronavirus, developing countries from every region of the world 
are asking their major banker (China) to renegotiate, restructure, delay, or outright forgive the 
billions of dollars loans that are coming due this year. This has placed Beijing in a very difficult 
position. First, given the sharp economic contraction, and in some countries near economic 
collapse, most developing countries, in particular, the low-income countries are simply not in 
a position to meet their debt obligations. Second, although Beijing has ruled out debt 
forgiveness (but signalled its willingness to negotiate debt restructuring with individual 
countries), it may have no choice but to write-off much of the loans, including outright 
forgiveness for high-risk debtors. In fact, without significant write-offs, there is high 
probability that many of the poorest countries will simply default. If Beijing chooses to seize 
debtor assets, especially in the midst of the pandemic, it will be accused of engaging in heartless 
debt-trap diplomacy and face a potential anti-China backlash, which it can ill afford at a time 
when its international image has hit rock-bottom due to its role in the spread of COVID-19. 
Indeed, seizing debtor assets may not be worth the trouble as much of the infrastructure projects 
used as collateral are unprofitable “white elephants.” Third, Beijing’s global lending spree is 
bound to have domestic ramifications. Not only will the Chinese government lose billions of 
dollars in unrecoverable loans but also its already highly leveraged financial system straining 
under a mountain of bad debt accumulated by state-run banks, state-run enterprises, 
construction companies, and local governments could further undermine the already battered 
domestic economy, which has shrunk for the first time since the Deng reforms that began in 
1978. 
Finally, this unprecedented black-swam moment – with severe credit problems 
afflicting both creditor and debtor at the same time – requires unprecedented collective action. 
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In March 2020, following the United Nations’ call for debt relief for the world’s least-
developed countries, several G-20 countries and the IMF suspended debt service for the year, 
besides requesting private creditors to do the same. However, the PRC insisted that it preferred 
to deal with its debtors individually despite pressure for Beijing to make common cause with 
the G-20 and other multilateral organizations to help struggling debtor nations, in particular, 
the world’s poorest nations to ride out the current storm. Finally, in late June, Beijing 
announced that it had suspended debt repayments for several countries as part of the G-20’s 
April “Debt Service Suspension Initiative” (DSSI), designed to provide a coordinated, “time-
bound” suspension of payments from May through the end of 2020 by all bilateral official 
creditors. But its overall commitment and effectiveness remains to be seen. As the key player, 
Beijing’s actions will be closely watched. Certainly, Beijing’s meaningful response will go a 





Abi-Habib, Maria. 2018. “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port?” The New York 
Times, 25 June. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-
port.html  
Brautigam, Deborah. 2020. “A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Rise of 
a Meme.” Area Development and Policy 5 (1): 1-14.  
Brautigam, Deborah, Yufan Huang, and Acker Kevin. 2020. Risky Business: New Data on 
Chinese Loans and Africa’s Debt Problem (Briefing Paper No. 3). Washington, DC: 




Chellaney, Brahma. 2017. “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy.” Project Syndicate, 23 January. 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-
by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01?barrier=accesspaylog  
Fernholz, Tim. 2018. “China’s ‘Debt Trap’ Is Even Worse than We Thought.” The Quartz, 29 
June. https://qz.com/1317234/chinas-debt-trap-in-sri-lanka-is-even-worse-than-we-
thought  
Horn, Sebastien, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch. 2020. “How Much Money 
Does the World Owe China?” Harvard Business Review, February 26. 
https://hbr.org/2020/02/how-much-money-does-the-world-owe-china  
IPS Working Paper No. 1                                                                                 
10 
 
Humphrey, Chris. 2015. Infrastructure Finance in the Developing World: Challenges and 
Opportunities for Multilateral Development Banks in 21st Century Infrastructure 
Finance. Seoul, Korea: Global Green Growth Institute; Washington, DC: The 
Intergovernmental Group of Twenty Four on Monetary Affairs and Development. 
http://gggi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/WP08-Challenges-and-Opporunties-for-
MDBs.pdf   
Hurley, John, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance. 2018. Examining the Debt Implications of 
the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective (CGD Policy Paper 121). 
Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. 
https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-
initiative-policy-perspective.pdf  
Institute of International Finance (IIF). 2019. China’s Outbound Investment: Myths vs. Data. 
Washington, DC: IIF.  
Lo, Kinling. 2019. “Sri Lanka Wants Its ‘Debt Trap’ Hambantota Port Back. But Will China 
Listen?” South China Morning Post, 7 December. 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3040982/sri-lanka-wants-its-
debt-trap-hambantota-port-back-will-china   
Macan-Markar, Marwaan. 2018. “Sri Lanka Sinks Deeper into China’s Grasp as Debt Woes 
Spiral.” Nikkei Asia, 29 August. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Sri-
Lanka-sinks-deeper-into-China-s-grasp-as-debt-woes-spiral  
Morris, Scott, Brad Parks, and Alysha Gardner. 2020. Chinese and World Bank Lending Terms:
 A Systematic Comparison across 157 Countries and 15 Years (CGD Policy Paper 170). 
Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. 
https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/chinese-and-world-bank-lending-terms-
systematic-comparison.pdf  
Pence, Mike. 2018. Vice President Mike Pence’s Remarks on the Administration’s Policy 
towards China. Washington, DC: Hudson Institute. 
https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-
administration-s-policy-towards-china102018  
Spegele, Brian, and Anna Isaac. 2020. “Hidden Chinese Lending Puts Emerging-Market 
Economies at Risk.” The Wall Street Journal, 30 March. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/hidden-chinese-lending-puts-emerging-market-
economies-at-risk-11585560600?reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink  
TRT World. 2019. “How China’s Debt Trap Diplomacy Works and What it Means.” TRT 
World, 13 December. https://www.trtworld.com/africa/how-china-s-debt-trap-
diplomacy-works-and-what-it-means-32133   
Wang, Mingjie. 2019. “China Warns US over BRI Crticism.” China Daily Global, 10 May. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201905/10/WS5cd54685a3104842260bb06f.html  
